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National IQ Means Transformed from
Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) Scores, and their Underlying Gene Frequencies! 
Volkmar Weiss!! 
German Central Office for Genealogy 
Any general statement as to whether the secular trend of a society 
is eugenic or dysgenic depends upon a reliable calibration of the 
measurement of general intelligence. Richard Lynn set the mean IQ of 
the United Kingdom at 100 with a standard deviation of 15, and he 
calculated the mean IQs of other countries in relation to this 
“Greenwich IQ”. But because the UK test scores are declining, the 
present paper recalibrates the mean IQ 100 to the average of seven 
countries having a historical mean IQ of 100. By comparing Lynn-
Vanhanen-IQ with PISA scores and educational attainment of native 
and foreign born populations transformed into IQ, we confirmed brain 
gain and brain drain in a number of nations during recent decades. 
Furthermore, the growth of gross domestic product per capita can be 
derived as a linear function of the percentage of people with an IQ 
above 105 and its underlying frequency of a hypothetical major gene of 
intelligence. 
Key Words: General intelligence; PISA; GDP; Dysgenics; Smart fraction theory; 
Immigration. 
The Calibration of National IQ Means 
Most intelligence tests, such as those used by Lynn and Vanhanen 
(2002, 2006) in their compilations, have been constructed in Britain and the 
United States and have subsequently been administered to samples of the 
populations in other countries throughout the world. In order to make 
comparisons possible, Lynn set the mean IQ of Britain at 100 with a standard 
deviation of 15, and he calculated the mean IQs of other countries in relation 
to this “Greenwich IQ”. 
As the standard of living during the phase of early industrialization 
deteriorated, the height of Saxony’s soldiers decreased within a time span of 
60 years (birth years 1775-1835) by about 6 cm (Cinnirella, 2008). 
                                 
! This is an updated and expanded version of an earlier paper entitled National IQ 
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Gene Frequencies published in Volume XLIX Number 2 of The Mankind Quarterly Winter 
2008. 
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Analogous secular trends up and down have been reported for all 
industrialized countries, and in the past century the acceleration of bodily 
growth has been accompanied by a similar secular rise of cognitive test scores, 
usually called the Flynn Effect (Fernandez-Ballesteros and Juan-Espinosa, 
2001).  
In the case of the Standard Progressive Matrices test, for example, which 
has been administered in many countries and which Lynn and Vanhanen 
(2002) used extensively for the calculation of national IQs, the British mean 
IQ increased at a rate of approximately 2 IQ points per decade from 1938, 
when the test was constructed, up to 1979. Where this and other tests have 
been used, adjustments for the secular rise of IQs have been made by Lynn. 
In some cases such an adjustment involved a bit of guesswork, but in 
retrospect and comparing it with other data sets available now (see Tables 1 
and 3), an excellent and innovative job has been done. 
Table 1 
PISA scores (500; 100) of mathematical literacy and the respective means of 
differences from the mean of seven countries (whose Lynn-Vanhanen 
mean IQ is 100), these differences transformed into PISA IQ (100; 15) 
values, Lynn-Vanhanen estimates of IQ 2002 and 2006, and 
Rindermann estimates of IQ (from which 1 point is already subtracted 
in the lower part of the table) 
 
Country PISA 
2000(1) 
PISA 
2003(2) 
PISA 
2006(3) 
mean 
diff. 
PISA IQ L/V IQ 
2002(4) 
L/V IQ 
2006(5) 
Rind IQ 
2007(6) 
Belgium 520 529 520 +2 100 100 99  100- 1 
Canada 533 532 527 +8 101 97 99  102- 1 
Netherlands (535)* 538 531 +15 102 102 100  102- 1 
New 
Zealand 
537 523 522 +3 100 100 99  101- 1 
Sweden 510 509 502 -15 98 101 99  101- 1 
Switzerland 529 527 530 +6 102 101 101  101- 1 
United 
Kingdom 
529 (512)* 495 -10 99 100 100  102- 1 
mean of 
these 7 
countries  
528 524 518 1 .3 100 .29 100 .14 99 .57 101 
-1 
.29 
corrected 
mean 
527 523 517  100 100   100 .29 
Argentina 388  381 -138 79 96 93  88 
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Country PISA 
2000(1) 
PISA 
2003(2) 
PISA 
2006(3) 
mean 
diff. 
PISA IQ L/V IQ 
2002(4) 
L/V IQ 
2006(5) 
Rind IQ 
2007(6) 
Australia 533 524 520 +3 100 98 98  100 
Austria 515 506 505 -14 98 102 100  100 
Brazil 334 356 370 -169 75 87 87  83 
Bulgaria 430  413 -101 85 93 93  95 
Chile 384  411 -125 81 93 90  88 
Czech 
Republic  
498 516 510 -14 98 97 98  99 
Denmark 514 514 513 -9 99 98 98  98 
Finland 536 544 548 +20 103 97 99  102 
France 517 511 496 -14 98 98 98  99 
Germany 490 503 504 -23 97 102 99  98 
Greece 447 445 459 -73 89 92 92  96 
Hong 
Kong 
560 550 547 +30 104 107 108  105 
Hungary 488 490 491 -33 95 99 98  100 
Iceland 514 515 506 -11 98 98 101  100 
Indonesia 367 360 391 -150 78 89 87  85 
Ireland 503 503 501 -15 98 93 92  97 
Israel 433  447 -82 88 94 95  95 
Italy 457 466 462 -61 91 102 102  100 
Japan 557 534 523 +16 102 105 105  104 
Korea 
(South) 
547 542 547 +23 103 106 106  105 
Latvia 463 483 486 -45 93 97 98  97 
Luxembourg 446 493 490 -46 93 101 100  98 
Mexico 387 385 406 -130 81 87 88  84 
Norway 499 495 490 -27 96 98 100  99 
Poland 470 490 495 -37 94 99 99  98 
Portugal 454 466 466 -60 91 95 95  94 
Russia 478 468 476 -45 93 96 97  98 
Slovakia - 498 492 -25 96 96 96  98 
Spain 476 485 480 -42 94 97 98  97 
Thailand 432 417 417 -103 85 91 91  90 
Tunisia - 359 365 -158 76 84 83  84 
Turkey - 423 424 -97 85 90 90  87 
United 
States 
493 493 474 -39 94 98 98  99 
Uruguay - 422 427 -96 86 96 96  91 
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(xxx)* Mean of the two other PISA values of this country 
- no data 
 
SOURCES: 
• (1) OECD (2003). Literacy skills for the world of tomorrow – further results 
from PISA 2000, p. 100. 
• (2) OECD (2004). A profile of student performance in mathematics, p. 92. 
• (3) OECD (2007a). Executive Summary. PISA 2006, p. 53. 
• (4) Lynn, R. & Vanhanen, T. (2002). IQ and the wealth of nations. 
Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 73ff. 
• (5) Lynn, R. & Vanhanen, T. (2006). IQ and global inequality. Augusta, 
GA: Washington Summit Publ., p. 55ff. 
• (6) Rindermann, H. (2007). The g-factor of international cognitive 
ability comparisons: the homogeneity of results in PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS and IQ-
tests. European Journal of Personality, 21, 667-706, here p. 700ff. 
 
 
In 2002, after the publication of “IQ and the Wealth of Nations” (Lynn 
and Vanhanen, 2002) and the preliminary reports of PISA 2000, Weiss 
became aware that PISA tests can be understood as IQ tests (Weiss, 2002) 
and that the transformation of PISA scores into IQ results in very similar 
numbers (Weiss, 2005, 2006). PISA scores, mean 500, standard deviation 
100, can easily be transformed into IQ values, mean 100, standard deviation 
15, by adding or subtracting the deviation from the mean in the relationship 
100 : 15 = 6.67, that a mean of PISA 433 corresponds to IQ 90, PISA 567 
to IQ 110, if PISA 500 is set to be IQ 100. 
But can a PISA score of 500 be set to be IQ 100? The mean of 500 is 
the mean of all participating countries of the OECD, not the mean of the 
United Kingdom. In the 2003 PISA study, because of the inclusion for the 
first time of Turkey in the sample of reference to calculate the mean of 500, 
the average of Germany and other countries has risen 3 (non-transformed) 
PISA points (corresponding to 0.45 IQ) in comparison to 2000, without 
their contributing anything to such an effect.  
In 2000 the PISA score of the United Kingdom was 529, but in 2006 
only 495. This would mean a PISA IQ of 104 in 2000 and 99 in 2006, but 
we had to set this 104 and 99 to be the “Greenwich IQ” of 100. As it seems, 
it could be that the average IQ of the United Kingdom was or is actually 
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declining (compare Flynn, 2009), and it is not reasonable to calibrate the IQ 
of the world to the waterline of a single leaking ship. In order to avoid this 
methodological pitfall, we set the arithmetic means of the PISA scores in 
2000, 2003, and 2006 of seven countries of which the mean IQ was 
estimated by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) to be 100 as IQ 100 (see Table 1). 
Seen as a whole, rise and decline of IQ within these seven countries seem to 
be in relative equilibrium.  
As shown by Rindermann (2007), combining the scores of the 
mathematics, readings and science subtests of PISA makes no essential 
difference from using the mathematical subtest alone, because all subtests of 
PISA are heavily loaded with general cognitive ability. For example, in 2006 
the transformed PISA mean of Germany on the reading scale is IQ 98, on the 
science scale IQ 99, on the mathematical scale IQ 98. Essentially, all three 
scales of PISA measure general intelligence (Lehrl, 2005). 
Unifying the results of international educational research (not only of 
PISA but also the analogous inclusion of TIMSS and PIRLS) and 
differential psychology (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) into a plausible estimate 
(also the intention of Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007) of respective 
national IQs is the merit of Rindermann’s contribution (2007). However, he 
did miss the problem of calibration entirely. As can be seen in Table 1, the IQ 
values estimated by him are on average 1 point too high. In their publications, 
today’s educational psychologists prefer to avoid the terms “intelligence” and 
“IQ” completely (Brand, 1995; Brand, Constales and Kane, 2003; Weiss, 
2002).  
The Effects of Selective Migration 
and Differential Fertility on IQ Means 
Before the author had calculated Table 2, he was as convinced as 
anybody else that educational attainments are difficult to compare across 
nations. However, most recently published data, in which the educational 
attainments of natives and migrants are separately published, were the 
incentive to estimate the effects of migration on IQ means. 
Educational attainments were transformed into IQ in the following way: 
The OECD average of native-borns with less than upper secondary 
education is 41%, which corresponds to a median percentile of 20.5 and 
IQ 89. The average of people with upper secondary and post-secondary 
education is 40%, which corresponds to a median percentile of 41 + 20 
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= 61 and IQ 104. The average of adult people with tertiary education is 
18%, which corresponds to a median percentile of 41 + 40 + 9 = 91 and 
hence IQ 120. However, because the calibrated OECD average is not IQ 
100 but IQ 96 (see Table 1), we have to correct IQ 89 to IQ 85, IQ 104 to 
IQ 100 and IQ 120 to IQ 116. 
Now, in order to calculate the mean IQ of the native-born population of 
Australia (see Table 2), we had to multiply 46 x 85 = 3910, 15 x 100 = 
1500, and 39 x 116 = 4524. By adding 3910 + 1500 + 4524 = 9934, 
divided by 100, we get a mean “educational IQ” of 99. In the analogous 
way we calculate for the foreign-born population of Australia a mean IQ 
of 101. Because the percentage of immigrants into Australia amounts to 
25%, the mean educational IQ of its total population is 100. 
Table 2 
Educational attainment of the native- and foreign-born populations of 
OECD countries, percentage of immigrants, and Educational IQ (100; 
15) of the total populations 
 
Country  Native/foreign
: less than 
upper 
seconday(1) % 
- Mean IQ 85 
Native/ 
foreign: 
tertiary(1) 
 % 
- Mean 
IQ 116 
Immi-
grants 
 (2) % 
Educational 
IQ of total 
population(3
) 
Difference 
of Educ. IQ 
foreign/ 
native 
borns(4) 
Australia 46 / 38 39 / 43 25 100 + 2 
Austria 33 / 49 11 /11 12 98 - 3 
Belgium 47 / 54 23 / 22 11 97 - 2 
Canada 32 / 30 32 / 38 18 100 + 2 
Czech 
Republic 
23 / 38 10 / 13 6 99 - 2 
Denmark 41 / 49 19 / 19 4 98 - 2 
Finland 40 / 53 23 / 19 3 100 - 3 
France 46 / 55 17 / 18 9 97 - 1 
Germany 24 / 44 19 / 15 7 101 - 3 
Greece 54 /45 13 / 15 1 95 + 1 
Hungary 45 / 41 11 / 20 4 96 + 1 
Ireland 48 / 30 23 / 41 11 97 + 6 
Italy 64 / 54 8 / 12 2 92 + 2 
Japan 25 / 26 27 / 30 1 102 - 2 
Luxembour
g 
29 / 37 13 / 22 27 97  0 
Mexico 72 / 37 11 / 38 1 90 + 11 
Netherlands 41 / 53 19 / 18 11 98 - 2 
New 30 / 19 27 / 31 20 100 + 2 
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Country  Native/foreign
: less than 
upper 
seconday(1) % 
- Mean IQ 85 
Native/ 
foreign: 
tertiary(1) 
 % 
- Mean 
IQ 116 
Immi-
grants 
 (2) % 
Educational 
IQ of total 
population(3
) 
Difference 
of Educ. IQ 
foreign/ 
native 
borns(4) 
Zealand 
Norway 21 / 18 23 / 31 6 102 0 
Poland 31 / 48 10 / 12 3 95 0 
Portugal 80 / 55 8 / 19 3 90 + 5 
Spain 64 / 55 19 / 22 5 94 + 1 
Sweden 25 / 30 23 / 24 12 101 - 2 
Switzerland 18 / 42 26 / 24 25 102 - 3 
Turkey 79 /49 5 / 17 2 90 + 5 
United 
Kingdom 
29 / 41 20 / 35 12 99 0 
United 
States 
22 / 40 27 / 26 7 101 - 3 
OECD 
average 
41 / 41 18 / 23 7 96 + 2 
 
SOURCES: 
• (1) OECD (2007b). OECD factbook 2007. Economic, Environmental and 
Social Statistics. Migration – Education - Educational attainment of immigrants. 
Table: The educational attainment of the native- and foreign born populations as 
a percentage of the population aged 15 and above, within each group, circa 2000. – 
The upper secondary and post-secondary educational attainment (mean IQ 100) is 
the difference between 100 and the sum of the percentages of the less than the 
upper secondary plus tertiary.  
• (2) Docquier, F. and A. Marfouk (2006). International migration by 
education attainment, 1990 - 2000. In: Özden, C. and M. Schiff (eds.): 
International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain (pp. 151-191). 
Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. - Table 5.6.A Net Brain Gain in OECD 
countries in 2000, pp. 182-183. 
• (3) Means, calculated on the basis of source (1) and two analogous data 
sets: List, J. and C. Schnabel (2004). Bildungsstagnation bei abnehmender 
Erwerbsbevölkerung. Bildungspolitische Herausforderungen durch Geringqualifizierte. 
Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen 
Nürnberg, Discussion Paper No. 26. – Table 1, p. 8: Ausbildungsstand der 25- bis 
64-jährigen Bevölkerung im internationalen Vergleich, 1992 and 2001. – The 
sources of List and Schnabel are OECD data (1995, 2003) and calculations of 
their own. In 1992 the OECD means of the 45% with less upper secondary were 
IQ 87, of the 36% with upper secondary IQ 101, and of the 11% with tertiary 
education IQ 120. 
• (4) These differences are only based on source (1).  
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The general correpondence of means of educational IQ, PISA IQ and 
Lynn-Vanhanen IQ should not be a complete surprise. Rindermann (2007) 
had already found a correlation of .78 across countries between mean IQ and 
educational level of young adults, operationalized by an index composed of 
three measures: 1. adult literacy rate 1991; 2. percentage of persons between 
12 and 19 years old 1960 – 1985, having graduated from secondary school; 
and 3. the mean of years of schooling of persons 25 years or older for 1990, 
1995 and 2000. 
Generally, the differences between Lynn-Vanhanen IQ, PISA IQ and 
Educational IQ do not exceed plus or minus two points. Whereas Lynn-
Vanhanen IQ is based on IQ-tested samples (in some countries even on a 
single, small and local sample), and PISA IQ is based on large and 
representative samples of schoolchildren, Educational IQ is based on data of 
the total adult population. Data on educational attainment, scaled as 
Educational IQ, and PISA results do confirm, in most cases within the limits 
of measurement error, the results of a century of IQ testing, summarized by 
Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006). Whoever active in the field of 
educational economy had ever imagined such a possibility?  
However, educational attainments are not well calibrated in all countries 
to allow international comparisons. Obviously, the Educational IQ of the 
United States does not fit to its Lynn-Vanhanen IQ and PISA IQ. Because 
of the decline in value of a US college education arising from increases over 
time in the number of persons graduating from college, there is a stronger 
deflation of educational degrees in the United States than in other OECD 
countries. Also, Scandinavian degrees seem be more deflated than degrees in 
the Netherlands. 
There is a theory of college-going decision-making (Arai, 1998) that is 
quite different from human capital theory (Wößmann, 2002; Hanushek and 
Woesmann, 2007). This alternative theory is based on the idea that the role 
of higher education is not to certify the knowledge and skills acquired in 
college, but simply to convey information to society about the degree holder’s 
innate productivity. According to this theory, those who have high 
productive capabilities acquire higher education so that firms can identify 
degree holders as more productive and pay them more. This role of education 
has been called signaling, screening, filtering or sorting by different authors 
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(Arrow, 1973; Burdett, 1978; Spence, 2002). The holding of a degree is also 
seen as a signal of whether an applicant is from a rich and educated family. 
This information is used to guess their productivity because those from rich 
and educated families are more productive either on average or with certainty 
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Mulligan, 1999). Signaling (filtering) theory 
assumes that higher education does not improve a student’s talents, because it 
does not change his genotype. An employer uses a job applicant’s educational 
rank or years of education (this means, in our context, his Educational IQ) to 
infer his position in the distribution of abilities. The education system of most 
countries consists of primary, secondary and tertiary education. Suppose that 
only primary education was initially compulsory and that compulsory 
education has been extended to the secondary level. Because of this change, 
the genotype of individuals whom the signaling theory considers to be of low 
ability and who used to receive only primary education will now receive 
secondary education. Then, the average productivity and accordingly wages 
of workers with secondary education will be lower than before and will be 
deflated. This is because the extended years of compulsory education will 
neither enhance the productivity of students nor their IQ.  
Already in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in England the 
decrease of birth rates in the upper stratum led to the assumption of a threat 
of an accompanying decrease of average giftedness. But contrary to all such 
expectations, cognitive test scores rose over many decades (Fernandez-
Ballesteros and Juan-Espinosa, 2001). For a geneticist (Weiss, 1992) it seems 
clear that – in analogy to the already mentioned acceleration of body height – 
such a rise could only be a rise in phenotypic values and not in genotypic 
ones. Under the impression of the Flynn effect, the argument that a dysgenic 
development was imminent seemed to be ridiculous to the wider public 
(Lynn, 1996).  
In a comparative study of national fertility surveys taken around 1970, 
Finland was the only country where a positive correlation with fertility 
became more accentuated as a husband’s education increased (Jones, 1982). 
In view of the development in other Scandinavian countries (Teasdale and 
Owen, 2008), it can be doubted that such a trend has lasted up to today. 
A study (UN, 1995) that analyzed nationally representative surveys of 
26 countries (including 10 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but also Egypt, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, and Peru) found in all countries a strong 
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negative correlation between women’s years of education and their mean 
number of living children. This was confirmed by Meisenberg (2008) with 
data from the 1990, 1995 and 2000 waves of World Value Survey covering 
78 countries. Because this correlation has held for both industrialized and 
developing countries for more than half a century (Lam, 1997), economists 
are beginning to discuss the possible consequences (Bishop, 1989; Goujon 
and Lutz, 2004). Exceptions (as Finland temporarily was) are very few, and 
the elite of managers and professionals with sometimes a relatively high 
number of surviving children, (causing a U-shaped distribution of differential 
fertility in some countries) is numerically too small to have a trend-changing 
demographic effect. 
However, as it seems, within one generation or even within a few years 
the impact of dysgenic fertility on IQ means of countries is much smaller than 
the impact of selective migration.  
Table 3 
OECD countries with at least 7 percent immigrants, Lynn-Vanhanen 
estimates of IQ (2002), Educational IQ, PISA IQ, difference of 
Educational IQ between foreign and native born and the percentage of 
immigrants among the adult population, and difference of PISA IQ 
between children with and without migrational background 
 
Country  L/V IQ 
2002(see 
Table 1) 
 
Mean 
year of 
birth 
about 
1955 
Educational 
IQ(see Table 2) 
 
Mean year 
of birth 
about 1960 
PISA IQ 
(see Table 1) 
Mean 
year of 
birth 
1988 
Difference. of 
Educ. IQ 
foreign/native 
born and 
percentage of 
immigrants(see 
Table 2) 
Difference of 
PISA IQ 
between 
children with 
and without 
migrational 
background(1) 
Ireland 93 97 98 + 6 – 11% 0 
Australia 98 100 100 + 2 – 25% +1 
Canada 97 100 101 + 2 – 18% 0 
New 
Zealand 
100 100 100 + 2 – 20% - 1 
United 
Kingdom 
100 99 99  0 – 12% no data 
France 98 97 98 - 1 - 9% - 8 
Belgium 100 97 100 - 2 – 11% - 13 
Netherlands 102 97 102 - 2 – 11% - 10 
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Country  L/V IQ 
2002(see 
Table 1) 
 
Mean 
year of 
birth 
about 
1955 
Educational 
IQ(see Table 2) 
 
Mean year 
of birth 
about 1960 
PISA IQ 
(see Table 1) 
Mean 
year of 
birth 
1988 
Difference. of 
Educ. IQ 
foreign/native 
born and 
percentage of 
immigrants(see 
Table 2) 
Difference of 
PISA IQ 
between 
children with 
and without 
migrational 
background(1) 
Sweden 101 101 98 - 2 – 12% - 10 
Austria 102 98 98 - 3 – 12% - 9 
Germany 102 101 97 - 3 – 7% - 12 
Switzerland 101 102 102 - 3 – 25% - 12 
United 
States 
98 101 94 - 3 - 7% - 4 
 
SOURCES: 
• (1) Means, calculated on the basis of three data sets: Zimmermann, K. 
F. (2005), Herausforderungen des demografischen Wandels für den Standort 
Deutschland, Berlin: DIW; p. 16, Mathematikleistungen im PISA-Test. – Levels, 
M., and Dronkers, J. (2008). Educational performance of native and immigrant 
children from various countries of origin. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32 1404-1425; 
p. 1414, Table3; OECD PISA 2003, n = 67,865. – de Heus, and Dronkers, J. 
(2008). Can educational systems compensate for societal features? International 
Conference on Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural 
Contexts, Berlin; Table 2; n = 9414 immigrant pupils, OECD PISA 2006.  
 
At an average, schoolchildren tested by PISA are born about one 
generation later than the subjects of IQ test samples summarized by Lynn and 
Vanhanen (2002). By comparying Lynn-Vanhanen IQ means with PISA IQ 
means, we see clearly that in Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
(Winkelmann, 2000), where the Educational IQ of immigrants is higher than 
of natives, the IQ of the total population is rising; and in Germany and 
Austria where the Educational IQ of immigrants is lower than of natives the 
IQ is declining. A rise of 5 IQ points in Ireland is contrasted with a 5 point 
decline in Germany. Background data from many sources (List and Schnabel, 
2004; Zimmermann, 2005; Belot and Hatton, 2008; Brücker and Ringer, 
2008; de Heun and Dronkers, 2008; Levels and Dronkers, 2008; Levels et 
al., 2008) corroborate that this rise and fall is a real one. 
The figure of 7% of immigrants in Germany (see Table 3) is clearly an 
underestimate (immigrants from the former Soviet Union obtain in most 
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cases German citizenship and are not counted as foreigners in governmental 
statistics). Other sources (OECD, 2004) speak of more than 20% of 
schoolchildren with at least one foreign-born parent (the microcensus of 
2007 has counted 27% of such families; Brücker and Ringer, 2008.) In 
Germany the IQ mean of pupils with Turkish background, comprising about 
half of all immigrants (Levels et al., 2008), is 18 points lower than the IQ of 
natives (de Heus and Dronkers, 2008), and in the second migrant generation 
even 3 points lower than in the first (Levels and Dronkers, 2008). 
Taking OECD countries as a whole, the mean IQ of immigrants is 2 
points higher than of native-borns (OECD, 2007b), overriding in such a way 
the effects of dysgenic fertility in many industrialized countries. The brain 
gain (Mueller-Jentsch, 2008), especially of English-speaking countries, is 
contrasted with a brain drain from third-world and East European countries 
(Docquier, 2006; Docquier and Marfuk, 2006; Von der Oelsnitz et al. 2007; 
Belot and Hatton, 2008). There, the combination of brain drain with 
dysgenic fertility is leading to a fast decline of mean IQ, especially in South 
Africa and some countries of Latin America (Weiss, 2007; Lynn, 2008). For 
example, Children of immigrants from China, India and Vietnam to OECD 
countries have a mean PISA IQ of 106 (Levels et al., 2008), and furthermore 
also emigrants from Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to Australia and New Zealand a mean IQ above 100 (see for 
very detailed tables: Heus and Dronkers, 2008).  
Clearly, within one generation the effect of selective migration on IQ 
means is in many countries much higher than by differential fertility. The data 
show that Finland seems to be the only country in the world where the IQ 
mean has risen by eugenic fertility during the last half century.  
Table 4 
Highly gifted men and the percentage of their highly gifted male relatives 
(classified by occupation and achievement in the studies by Galton, 
Terman, Brimhall, and Weiss) 
 
  Galton 
% 
Terman 
% 
Brimhall 
% 
Weiss 
% 
 n (Weiss), mean year of 
birth 
Probands 100 84+ 100 97+ 1972: 1329, 1994: 357, 
born 1947 
Fathers 26 41 29 40 346, b. 1917 
Brothers 47 - 49 49 220, b. 1947 
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  Galton 
% 
Terman 
% 
Brimhall 
% 
Weiss 
% 
 n (Weiss), mean year of 
birth 
Sons 60 64* - 55 77, b. 1972 
Grandfathers 14 - 9 9 681, b. 1887 
Uncles 16 - 13 14 615, b. 1917 
Nephews 23 - - 22 76, b. 1970 
Grandsons 14 - - - - 
Great-grandfathers 0 - - 4 1290, b. 1857 
Uncles of the 
parents 
5 - - 5 1996, b. 1887 
Cousins 16 - 9# 18 570, b. 1942 
Great-grandsons 7 - - - - 
Cousins of parents - - - 11 2250, b. 1917 
 
“+”: classified by occupation; 100%, if classified by test 
“*”: Classified only by IQ; classification by occupation gives about 55%; n = 820. 
“#”: some cousins were still too young and did not have full opportunity to 
become distinguished 
“-”: no data 
 
SOURCES: 
• Galton, F. (1869). Hereditary Genius. London: Macmillan, p. 195. 
100 famous men (n = 43) of science and the percentage of their famous 
male relatives.  
• Oden, M H. (1968). The fulfillment of promise: 40-year follow-up of the 
Terman group. 
Genetical Psychology Monographs, 77, 3-93. 
The mean IQ (transformed to 100;15) of the sample of probands was 146 
(n = 724); the cut-off score IQ 137.  
• Brimhall, D. R. (1922/23). Family resemblances among American men 
of science. 
The American Naturalist, 56, 504-547, 57, 74-88, 137-152, and 326-344. 
In 1915 questionnaires were filled in by 956 distinguished American men of 
science and their relatives.  
• Weiss, V. (1994). Mathematical giftedness and family relationship. 
European Journal for High Ability, 5, 58-67.  
Highly gifted males (mean IQ 135 +/- 9) and their relatives in professions 
and occupational positions, typically associated with an IQ above 123. 
 
The Law of the Vital Few 
Another possibility for measuring differences between countries would 
be in terms of allele frequencies of genes underlying the IQ distribution. Until 
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now, attempts to discover effects of hypothetical major genes underlying this 
distribution (for all arguments in favor and against such a hypothesis, see 
Weiss, 1992, 2000) have been fruitless (Payton, 2006). In the present state of 
knowledge, this neither proves nor disproves the existence or non-existence 
of such genes. In most countries, funding of such research and even the 
hypothesis of such genes is politically incorrect (Weiss, 2007). 
Francis Galton was the first to replace mere speculation on the 
inheritance of talent with statistical data (Galton, 1869). There is an obvious 
parallelism between the data collected by Weiss (2000; p. 80) in 1970/71 and 
his follow-up in 1993 (see Weiss, 1992; 1994) and the data of Galton, 
Terman and co-workers (Oden, 1968), and Brimhall (1922/23). 
In the first column of Table 4 (Galton, 1869), we see famous scientists of 
past centuries and their famous relatives belonging to the upper stratum of 
society; in the last column, schoolchildren of a so-called socialist state (Weiss, 
1992, 1994), selected by nation-wide mathematical competitions, and their 
relatives scattered over the whole spectrum of jobs and occupations. In 
addition, we see the Californian top performers of Terman’s Stanford-Binet 
IQ testing in 1916 (Oden, 1968), and Brimhall’s sample (1922/23) of famous 
American men of science. Such a parallel can only arise if Galton’s and 
Brimhall’s criteria of fame; Weiss’ criterion of giftedness for mathematics, 
science and high accomplishments in other fields; and Terman’s definition of 
high IQ have something substantial in common. Unconsciously (or perhaps 
better: very consciously), Galton, Terman, Brimhall, and Weiss must have 
shared the same intuitive understanding of a qualitative threshold beyond 
which we can speak of well-above-average cognitive ability. Any contribution 
to the genetics of general cognitive ability has to try to find an explanation for 
the regularity of this table. 
By applying the method of stochastic Mendelian matrices (Li and Sacks, 
1954) as early as 1971, Weiss (see Weiss, 1992, 2000) put forward the 
hypothesis that a major gene, M1, could explain the frequency of fame and 
high giftedness among the consanguine kin of the highly gifted. In a 
population with a mean IQ of about 100, the frequency q of this allele M1 
was estimated to be about 0.20. From this, and from the segregation of IQ 
within families (Weiss, 1992, 1994), it follows that individuals with an IQ 
above 123 are homozygote M1M1, and those above 104 are heterozygote 
M1M2 (where M2 could stand for an unknown series of alleles). 
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According to Jensen (1980, p. 115.): “The socially and personally most 
important threshold regions on the IQ scale are those that differentiate with 
high probability between persons who because of their level of general mental 
ability ... can or cannot succeed in the academic or college preparatory 
curriculum through high school (about 105).” Independently, an author who 
is publishing on the world wide web under the pseudonym “La Griffe du 
Lion” [The Paw of the Lion] put forward his “smart fraction theory” (2004), 
stating: “In market economies, per capita GDP is directly proportional to the 
population fraction with IQ greater than 105. …According to the 1992 
Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level Exam Users Manual, at an 
IQ level of 106 we might expect to find bookkeepers, credit clerks, laboratory 
technicians, salesmen and secretaries. At slightly higher IQs we find registered 
nurses, sales account executives, administrative assistants and store managers. 
These people are not rocket scientists. They are, however, vital to a 
flourishing economy. Any nation … needs a cognitive core to carry its water.” 
While Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) found a nonlinear relationship between 
GDP and IQ, La Griffe du Lion asserts that per capita GDP is related linearly 
to the percentage of smart fraction. We can go a step further and extend his 
argument.  
From the Hardy-Weinberg-law of population genetics, it follows that the 
frequency q of the hypothetical major gene M1 is (1-q)2 + 2q(1-q) + q2 = 1. 
From q = 0.20 follows that 2q(1-q) + q2 = 0.36. This frequency of 0.36 and 
its percentile rank not only correspond to an IQ of 105 (in a population with 
a mean IQ of 100), but are also identical with the smart fraction suggested by 
La Griffe du Lion. By extracting the root from the non-smart fraction (1-q)2, 
we get the allele frequency q of M1 (see Table 5) in different countries. 
Table 5 
Mean of Rindermann estimates of IQ (minus 1) and PISA IQ, smart 
fraction of the population (percentage above IQ 105.6), allele frequency 
of the hypothetical major gene M1 underlying iq, 0.93 theoretical GDP 
per capita (1998), and 0.57 real GDP per capita (2007) 
 
Country Mean of 
Rind IQ (-
1) (1) and 
PISA IQ 
(See Table 
1) 
Smart 
Fraction(2) 
% 
Gene 
Frequency 
M1(3) 
0.93 X 
Theoretical GDP 
(1998) Per Cap 
$(2) 
0.57 X 
Real GDP 
(2007) Per 
Cap $(4) 
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Country Mean of 
Rind IQ (-
1) (1) and 
PISA IQ 
(See Table 
1) 
Smart 
Fraction(2) 
% 
Gene 
Frequency 
M1(3) 
0.93 X 
Theoretical GDP 
(1998) Per Cap 
$(2) 
0.57 X 
Real GDP 
(2007) Per 
Cap $(4) 
Finland 103 43 0.24 24100 20200 
Netherlands 102 41 0.23 22600 22000 
Canada 101 38 0.21 21200 21800 
Switzerland 101 38 0.21 21200 22700 
United 
Kingdom 
100 36 0.20 19800 20100 
New 
Zealand 
100 36 0.20 19800 15600 
Australia 100 36 0.20 19800 21400 
Belgium 100 36 0.20 19800 20800 
Sweden 99 33 0.18 18400 21000 
Austria 99 33 0.18 18400 22200 
France 99 33 0.18 18400 19300 
Denmark 99 33 0.18 18400 21300 
Germany 98 31 0.18 17100 19600 
Ireland 98 31 0.18 17100 26000 
United 
States 
97 28 0.15 15800 26200 
Italy 96 26 0.14 14600 17700 
Spain 96 26 0.14 14600 19200 
Greece 93 20 0.11 11200 17400 
Portugal 93 20 0.11 11200 12400 
Israel 92 18 0.09 10200 16400 
Uruguay 89 13 0.07 7500 6100 
Thailand 88 12 0.06 6800 4600 
Turkey 86 10 0.05 5400 5400 
Chile 85 9 0.05 4700 8200 
Argentina 84 8 0.04 4200 7400 
Mexico 83 7 0.03 3700 7100 
Indonesia 82 6 0.03 3300 1900 
Tunisia 80 4 0.02 2400 4300 
Brazil 79 4 0.02 2100 5500 
 
 
SOURCES: 
• (1) Rindermann, H. (2007). The g-factor of international cognitive ability 
comparisons: the homogeneity of results in PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS and IQ-tests. 
PISA Scores and their Underlying Gene Frequencies 87 
Volume 34, Number 1, Spring 2009 
European Journal of Personality, 21, 667-706, here p. 700ff. 
• (2) La Griffe du Lion (2004). Smart fraction theory II. Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 11ff.; 
http://www.lagriffedulion.f2s.com/sft2.htm , retrieved on 2005-05-07. 
• (3) Weiss, V. (1992). Major genes of general intelligence. Personality and 
individual Differences, 13, 1115-1134. – Weiss, V. (1995). The advent of a molecular 
genetics of general intelligence. Intelligence, 20, 115-124.  
• CIA (2008). The world factbook. Washington, D. C.: Potomac, retrieved on 
2008-24-01. 
 
 
Applying a rule of thumb, we see that this frequency multiplied by about 
1000 gives the theoretical GDP in 1998 (La Griffe du Lion, 2004). Now, 
indeed, the relationship between GDP and the frequency of a major gene 
underlying above-average IQ is a linear one. Also Docquier (2006) found a 
linear correlation of .68 between GDP per capita (average 1995-2005) and 
the proportion of workers with tertiary education in the labor force. This 
proportion is not identical to the smart fraction, but about half of it. 
The Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule), the law of the vital 
few, states that for many events 80% of the effects come from 20% of the 
causes (Koch, 2000). The power of a nation does not depend of its mere 
number, but of the percentage of its cognitive elite, optimized by social 
evolution (Weiss, 2000). Highly intelligent people are networking, and the 
economic effect of networking is the square of the nodes of the network, i.e. 
in our case the square of the number of people involved (Koch, 2000).  
Advanced methods, applied very successfully in the low IQ range, for 
example, homozygosity mapping and comparative genomic hybridization 
within consangineous families have still never been used in order to 
detect high-IQ genes. Of course, the IQ is influenced by hundreds of 
minor genes and other effects, measurable under certain circumstances 
and in subpopulations, but this does not exclude the possibility of major 
gene effects. 
A rationale for the search of such genes could include the following 
knowledge and steps: 1. homozygosity mapping among the relatives of 
highly gifted, who have an IQ above 123 (for them their Educational IQ 
could be a good estimate); 2. nonsynomously coding SNPs and other 
genetic polymorphisms that are found to be homozygous among relatives 
should be checked whether their distribution of allele frequencies in the 
data bases does fit the expected racial distribution of socially 
representative samples: about 0.20 of the rare allele among Eurasian 
populations and approximating 0.00 in sub-Saharan Africa; 3 .if either 1 
or 2. are given, the possible association between genotypes and IQ could 
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be checked by comparing with the genotypes of Craig Venter, James 
Watson and the highly intelligent volunteers of the Personal Genome 
Project, whose genomes can be accessed freely. 
In 1998, the GDP per capita of a country with a gene frequency of 0.20 
for M1 was about ninefold higher than for a country with a frequency of 
0.02; the absolute difference in GDP per capita was about $19,000. This gap 
between highly industrialized and underdeveloped countries has been 
widening since the beginning of the industrial revolution (Clark, 2007; Galor 
and Moav, 2002). 
The expected decrease in the world’s average IQ from 95 in 1950 to 87 
in 2050 (Weiss, 2007; similar Lynn and Harvey, 2008) means a decrease of 
the gene frequency q of Ml from 0.12 to 0.05 and a decrease of the smart 
fraction (with an IQ above 105) from 22% to about 10%; that means a 
decrease of about 4% per generation.  
It is common knowledge that non-market economies, in their increase in 
GDP, are not in step with market economies. While some former non-market 
countries with a high average IQ such as Estonia, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and especially China are narrowing the gap, those with a low average 
IQ seem to have no chance to catch up. On the one hand we have the 
impressive success story of Singapore (Lee, 2000); on the other hand are 
countries such as Haiti and Zimbabwe, which are not only backward, but 
suffer from mismanagement and brain drain. - In 1968, the Pacific island of 
Nauru possessed the highest GDP per capita in the world (cited from 
Wikipedia, 2008) due to its rich phosphate deposits. Today, after the 
exhaustion of these deposits, Nauru – faced with chaos amid political strife 
and the collapse of the economy caused by mismanagement and corruption – 
has a GDP more in accordance with the gene frequency of M1 in its 
population.  
One of the criteria that differentiate science from speculation is the 
power of prediction. In 2007, oil-producing Equatorial Guinea, a country 
with an average IQ of 59 (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002), one of the lowest in 
the world, had a GDP per capita of $44,100 (CIA, 2008), one of the highest 
in the world. We predict that after the exhaustion of the oil the GDP of this 
country will fall back into a range typical for a country with a gene frequency 
of M1 below 0.02. As long as the oil is flowing, a number of specialists and 
dealers of Lebanese, Chinese, Indian and other origins make money, but they 
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will abandon such a country after the boom. 
In Table 5 we included only countries with a long history of a market 
economy and with at least two sets of data from PISA studies. Therefore, the 
overall impression of this table is misleading, because three quarters of world 
population have a GDP per capita below Brazil. In 2007, in sub-Saharan 
Africa there are 12 countries with a GDP below $1,000, all with a gene 
frequency of M1 below 0.02. There has been no Flynn Effect in these 
countries. Therefore, a truncation of national IQs to a minimum of 80 would 
make sense, but would not make much difference in terms of gene 
frequencies. 
Some countries (for example, Brazil, Israel, South Africa) with a socially 
and regionally segregated or highly stratified population (and a high Gini-
index) have a much higher GDP than can be expected from their average IQ. 
In such countries, the variance of IQ within the overall population is higher 
than 15, and we should strive to replace the theoretical frequency of M1 by 
its real frequency. Most suitable would be measuring the percentage of 
subjects with an IQ above 105 directly.  
Even within developed nations, the difference between prosperous and 
more backward regions amounts to 10 and more IQ points. For example, in 
Germany the IQ average of Bavaria is about 10 points higher than that of 
Bremen (Ebenrett, Hansen and Puzicha, 2003); in Italy the difference 
between Venice and Sicily is 13 points; in Spain the difference between 
Aragon and Andalusia 8 points (OECD, 2007a); and in the United States 
the difference between New Hampshire and Mississipi is 10 points. Such 
differences, aggravated by internal migration between the economic core and 
the backward regions (Ebenrett, Hansen and Puzicha, 2003) – but not 
always of such magnitude – will be found in any country. However, the 
average IQ of 102 for Italy (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002) as a whole was never 
correct and can have been obtained only from testing in that country’s 
northern regions. 
When merging the 16 German states into one league table with the other 
28 OECD countries that report PISA 2003 performance data, Bavaria (IQ 
102) takes 5th place internationally, while the largest state of Germany, North 
Rhine-Westphalia (IQ 94) takes 35th place and the city state of Bremen 39th 
place (IQ 92) out of the 44 countries and states (Wößmann, 2007). 
There should be doubt whether the average IQ of China is really as high 
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as 105 (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2006) or even 106 (Rindermann, 2007; minus 
1 already subtracted). This average may hold for the coastal regions, but 
perhaps not for the provinces in the interior (neighboring Kyrgyzystan, for 
example, has in 2006 a PISA IQ of only 69). In view of the fact that also 
within industrialized countries (see further below) the difference between the 
prosperous economically backward regions amounts to about 10 IQ points, 
why should the situation in China be different? Also, for decades in China, as 
in most countries all over the world, highly qualified women bear only half the 
number of children as unqualified women: in the China region with primary 
education 2.14 children, with tertiary 1.08 (Goujon and Lutz, 2004). It is 
simple naiveté to believe a one-child-policy has changed anything in this 
respect.  
Within Brazil, the federal states of the south have an average IQ and 
GDP per capita similar to South Europe and four times higher than the states 
in the north-east of Brazil (CIA, 2007). Political turmoil and ethnic cleansing 
can eliminate or drive away the gifted of a country, and within a very short 
time harm the economy for decades to come (Weiss, 2000). Highly-skilled 
citizens from stagnating economies are unlikely merely to watch their 
standard of living decline, and they will vote with their feet. Their migration 
amplifies economic divergences within and between countries. 
There are three types of men (Weiss and Weiss, 2003): Men (with IQ 
above 123) who invent machines, men (with IQ above 104), who repair 
machines, and men who use machines. In a country where there are not 
enough men to construct and to repair a bridge, sooner or later traffic by 
railroad will break down (Malloy, 2008).  
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